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In many fisheries around the world, harvesting capacity is excessive and 
fish stocks are under threat. The Gulf of Papua prawn fishery (GPPF) 
presents a different set of management challenges. Limited property rights 
and fishing capacity, along with tension between a commercial fleet and 
indigenous fishing communities over access, have resulted in a relatively 
underdeveloped resource, conflict and considerable losses in economic 
returns. This article details the results of a joint project between the National 
Fisheries Authority (NFA) in Papua New Guinea and supporting Australian 
institutions on the management of the GPPF. The analysis indicates a catch 
target that maximises sustainable returns at biomass levels larger than 
biomass at maximum sustainable yield, thus protecting the resource, and 
a simple plan to share access to the inshore fishery. Both strategies are 
being implemented by the NFA. Together, they present one of the few very 
good examples of how to ‘get things right’ in the use and management of a 
fisheries resource, providing ‘win-win’ outcomes for Papua New Guinea. 
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The management of limited-access fisheries 
is a difficult challenge. In most cases, the 
harvesting capacity of the fishing fleet exceeds 
the biological capacity of the resource to 
regenerate, threatening its viability. In other 
cases, insecure property rights and conflicts 
between commercial fishing interests and 
indigenous fishing communities result in 
the resource being under-utilised or poorly 
managed, with a loss in community profits 
and well-being. Ideally, management of 
the fishery should enhance economic 
performance and guarantee the biological 
and economic sustainability of fish stocks for 
generations to come at levels that maximise 
social returns.
The National Fisheries Authority 
(NFA) has the task of managing all fishery 
resources in Papua New Guinea. The tuna 
fisheries, shared with other Pacific island 
nations, are examples of the challenges 
facing fishery management. The evidence 
suggests a danger of over-fishing—with 
stocks of bigeye and yellow fin tuna at levels 
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the GPPF between 2003 and 2006. The task 
of the joint NFA and CSIRO team was to 
construct logbook data and perform a stock 
assessment of banana prawns in the fishery. 
The joint ANU and NFA team assembled 
economic survey data and constructed and 
calibrated a bio-economic model of the 
fishery, based on the stock assessment, to 
indicate key management targets for optimal 
catch. In one of the first-ever examples of 
cooperation between economists, biologists 
and stock assessment scientists—at least 
in a developing country—both teams, 
in cooperation with a local management 
authority, provided recommendations to 
improve the management of the GPPF. 
Most recommendations have already been 
implemented, providing a good example 
of how to get things right in the use and 
management of a developing nation’s 
fisheries resources. 
We provide an overview of the GPPF 
and then some background on the new 
below stock at maximum sustainable yield 
(MSY)—and a clear loss in economic returns 
in these fisheries, with effort levels far 
greater than effort at maximum economic 
yield (MEY) (Kompas and Che 2006). The 
second most lucrative fishery in Papua 
New Guinea, the Gulf of Papua prawn 
fishery (GPPF) presents a different set of 
challenges. Here, limited property rights 
and fishing capacity, along with tension 
between a commercial fleet and indigenous 
fishing communities over access to an 
inshore fishery, have resulted in a relatively 
underdeveloped resource, conflict and 
considerable losses in economic returns.
With this concern in mind, the NFA and 
The Australian National University (ANU), 
in collaboration with the Commonwealth 
Scienti f ic  and Industr ial  Research 
Organisation (CSIRO) and the Australian 
Centre for International Agricultural 
Research (ACIAR), conducted a study of the 
economic performance and management of 
Figure 1  Annual catch of banana prawns in the GPPF, 1974–2004 (tonnes)
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target for the fishery, MEY, as well as detail 
the bio-economic model used to set this 
target for the GPPF. Then we present an 
estimate of the harvest function and discuss 
the results, outlining major policy guidelines 
for the management of the fishery. 
Overview of the Gulf of Papua 
prawn fishery
The GPPF lies west of Port Moresby, near 
Karima, and extends west to the mouth 
of the Fly River. Many species are caught 
but the main harvest is banana prawns, 
accounting for roughly half of Papua New 
Guinea’s total prawn catch and more than 
60 per cent of the gross value of production. 
Tiger and endeavour prawns are also caught. 
Historically, the harvest has been undertaken 
with 15 vessels, although recently increases 
in the price of fuel have reduced this number 
to less than ten. The catch of banana prawns 
from 1974 to 2004 averaged 517 tonnes per 
annum at an estimated average value of 
US$1.8 million. The catch has ranged from 
258 to 700 tonnes (Figure 1). The fishery 
remains closed to foreign involvement. 
Prawns are processed and packed on board 
and exported mainly to Japan, Singapore 
and Australia, or are sold domestically. 
The fishery is managed under the GPPF 
Management Plan, under the direction of 
the NFA. Until recently, fishing entitlements 
were granted by the NFA to boat owners on 
a single-year lease basis. 
Unlike many fisheries around the 
world, in the GPPF, estimates based on catch 
and effort data show that stocks of banana 
prawns are not under threat. If anything, 
given the recent fall in boats operating in 
the fishery, biomass has increased in the past 
few years (Figure 2), and has nevertheless 
been trending upwards over time. 
This is a key result. Until this biomass 
series  was constructed,  there was 
considerable doubt about the sustainability 
of the prawn stocks in the GPPF, a doubt 
Figure 2  Biomass estimates of banana prawns in the GPPF, 1976–2006 (tonnes)
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that in part explained the desire to constrain 
effort in the fishery and the reluctance on the 
part of the NFA to grant anything more than 
annual fishing licences (on a yearly lease 
basis). This limited property right makes it 
all but impossible for the commercial fishing 
industry to secure loans to upgrade vessels 
and conduct necessary continuing and long-
term repairs and maintenance—a constant 
complaint among industry representatives. 
The fleet in the GPPF comprises boats more 
than 30 years old, obtained as cast-offs from 
the Australian northern prawn fishery 
(NPF), and more than one-fourth of variable 
costs go to maintenance and repairs. 
Breakdowns at sea are commonplace. 
Finally, the GPPF is characterised by a 
highly productive inshore fishery within 
three nautical miles of the shoreline, 
which contains spawning grounds and 
is potentially accessed by indigenous 
communities who claim local fishing rights. 
This area is legally closed to the commercial 
fleet (the 15 boats that receive annual lease 
permits). Nevertheless, VMS and logbook 
data, compiled as part of the research 
effort in this project, showed that about 
one-third of the total prawn catch in the 
GPPF was coming from within this closed 
zone. This illegal accessing of the inshore 
waters (something long suspected) has 
been a source of great tension between the 
commercial fishing industry and traditional 
resource owners in the Gulf of Papua. 
Fortunately, the biological component of the 
project also showed that this illegal fishing 
did not appear to impact substantially on 
the sustainability of the prawn resource. 
From an economic perspective, however, 
catch rates within the three nautical mile 
zone were more than 30 per cent higher 
than from adjacent fishing grounds. For the 
most part, therefore, the economic viability 
of the fishery depends on operators in the 
commercial fishery accessing these inshore 
waters with higher prawn densities.
The bio-economic model and 
maximum economic yield
Based on relatively new insights (Grafton 
et al. 2007), the key economic target in 
fisheries management, the one applied 
in the GPPF, was MEY (Kompas 2005). 
Concentrating on sustainable yields alone, 
MEY occurs when the sustainable catch 
or effort level for the fishery as a whole 
maximises profits, or creates the largest 
difference between discounted total 
revenues and the total costs of fishing. For 
profits to be maximised, it must also be the 
case that the fishery applies a level of boat 
capital and other resources in combinations 
that minimise the costs of harvest at the 
MEY catch level. In other words, the fishery 
cannot be over-capitalised and vessels 
must use the right combinations of inputs 
such as gear, engine power, fuel, hull size 
and crew to minimise the cost of harvest 
at MEY (Grafton et al. 2006).
There are several points to note about 
MEY. First, for most practical discount 
rates and costs, MEY will imply that the 
equilibrium stock of fish is larger than that 
associated with MSY, providing a win-
win situation for fisheries management in 
terms of larger fish stocks and maximum 
profits (Grafton et al. 2007). In this sense, 
the economic objective of MEY is more 
‘conservationist’ than MSY and should 
in principle help protect the fishery 
from unforeseen or negative stochastic 
environmental shocks that could diminish 
the fish population. Second, the catch and 
effort levels associated with MEY will vary, 
as will profits, with a change in the price of 
fish or the cost of fishing. This is as it should 
be. If the price of fish increases, it pays to 
exploit the fishery more intensively, albeit 
at yields still less than MSY. If the cost of 
fishing rises, it is preferable to have larger 
stocks of fish and therefore less effort and 
catch.
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where Bt is the biomass of the stock at 
time t and B0 is virgin biomass, or stock at 
time zero, defined as maximum carrying 
capacity. In discrete time, the relevant 
relationship is
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where ht is the catch rate and z is a parameter. 
The measure 1ξ  reflects uncertainty or 
randomness in the (biomass) stock–
recruitment relationship in Equation 2. 
Harvest is generally assumed to be a function 
of the biomass and fishing effort at time t. 
Harvest function 
The harvest function at time t is given by 
20 (1 )t t th q E B e
α β ξ= +  (3)
where q0 is an intercept, Et is fishing effort 
at time t, Bi is biomass (or stock) at t and 
α and β are the parameters in the harvest 
function. The measure 2ξ  reflects uncertainty 
or the randomness in catch per unit of effort 
(CPUE) in Equation 3. From Equation 3, 
fishing effort is therefore given as  
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Total revenue function 
Annual total revenue at time t, TRt, is 
calculated as the multiple of harvest and 
the annual (average) price of each species 
of prawn, or 
Finally, as long as the cost of fishing 
increases with days fished and biomass 
decline, as it generally will, MEY as a 
target will always be preferred to MSY, 
and of course to any catch or effort level 
that corresponds with stocks that are 
smaller than those associated with MSY. 
The reasoning is simple: regardless of what 
happens to prices and costs, targeting catch 
and effort at MEY will always ensure that 
profits are maximised. Profits might be 
relatively low when the price of fish is low 
and the cost of fishing is high, but profits 
will still be maximised. With a biological 
target of MSY alone, however, it is quite 
possible that profits will be very small or 
even zero. The fishery would therefore 
be sustainable at MSY but would not be 
commercially viable, much less efficient. 
Estimating MEY for the GPPF required 
constructing a bio-economic model; in other 
words, combining the stock assessment with 
key economic relationships in a dynamic 
context. This required 
•	 a stock–recruitment relationship for the 
biology
•	 a harvest function, showing the 
relationship between effort, stock and 
catch, and
•	 measures of total revenues and costs.
Spawning stock–recruitment relationship 
Surplus-production models, as a stock–
recruitment relat ionship,  map the 
relationship between the growth or net 
additions to the stock of prawns as a 
function of existing stock size, based 
on a known catch and effort series. The 
key parameters are the intrinsic rate 
of growth, r, and maximum carrying 
capacity. In a continuous-time model of 
population growth, without including 
fishing behaviour, a so-called Schaeffer 
surplus production model is given by 
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=t t tTR h p  (5)
where pt is the price of prawns at time t. 
In some cases, the price of prawns will 
depend on the amount of harvest; in others, 
the price is constant and determined on a 
world market for prawns. For the case of the 
GPPF, where most of the prawns are sold 
overseas, individual harvesters have little 
influence on price.
Fishing cost function
Fishing costs, including labour, material, 
repairs and maintenance, and all other 
costs, are generally assumed to be a function 
of fishing effort and stock. Fishing costs at 
time t, ct, depend on a fixed-cost component 
and variable costs, which depend on fishing 
effort, Et, or
0 1γ γ= +t t t tc E  (6)
where 0γ t  is a fixed-cost parameter and 
1γ t  
is the variable cost share parameter. It is 
also assumed that 0γ t  and 
1γ t  are positive. 
Substitution from Equation 4 for effort 
gives 
1/
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in which the smaller the stock (or biomass), 
the larger is the cost of fishing. 
Profit and objective functions
Annual fishery profit at time t, Π t , is 
defined by subtracting annual total costs 
from annual total revenue, so that 
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The optimisation problem is to maximise 
aggregate profit over a period, T, through 
choice of the harvest, given by   
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where δ  is the discount rate. Solving 
Equation 9, subject to Equation 2, requires 
also that virgin biomass at time zero is 
known, or that it can be estimated. The 
optimal solution to Equation 9 establishes 
a catch value for MEY. 
Analysis of MSY 
The traditional management target, MSY, is 
obtained by solving Equation 2 for harvest, 
ignoring uncertainty (for the moment), so 
that
  
  (10)
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the research project. Key parameters in the 
biological model included a) a measure of 
biomass at maximum carrying capacity, 
0B , of 1,300 tonnes; b) an intrinsic growth 
rate, r , of 1.956; and c) a value for z  of 
one. The share parameters in the harvest 
function are given in Table 1. The main 
economic parameters, across more than 
30 categories, were obtained from annual 
economic surveys carried out by the NFA. 
The main cost components included the 
cost of fuel, repairs and maintenance, gear, 
crew and material costs (NFA 2006b). Of 
these, repairs and maintenance and fuel 
costs are the most important, by far. The 
discount rate was assumed to be 5 per cent 
and the price of banana prawns was fixed 
at US$7.17 a kilogram. Final results for 
MEY (obtained through a coded procedure 
in Maple) and related target measures are 
given in Table 2. 
The current harvest in the GPPF is 450 
tonnes per annum. The results show that 
the calculated value of harvest at MEY is 
580 tonnes, indicating that the fishery is 
underdeveloped. In order to maximise 
returns in the fishery, the harvest must 
increase. The value of the harvest at MEY is, 
however, smaller than the harvest at MSY, 
so the ratio of biomass at MEY to biomass 
at MSY is 1.23. This is important. Given 
the harvest function, it is clear that ‘thicker 
Estimates of the harvest function 
for the GPPF
A central component of the bio-economic 
model is the estimate of the harvest function, 
or the relationship between effort, stock (or 
biomass) and catch. A significant share 
parameter on the stock component indicates 
the presence of a ‘stock effect’, showing 
the importance of biomass on harvest and 
ultimately on the cost of fishing. Based on 
Equation 3, the econometric specification of 
the harvest function is given by 
0 1ln ln lnh E Bα α β= + +  (13)
where h, E and B are harvest (in tonnes), 
fishing effort (in fishing days) and prawn 
biomass (in tonnes), respectively, and 0α , 
1α  and β  are parameters to be estimated. 
The value of 0α  is the log of 
0q , for the 
intercept in Equation 3. Estimated results 
based on 27 annual observations between 
1978 and 2004 are presented in Table 1. All 
variables are measured in log form.
Results and policy implications
To obtain results, the bio-economic model 
was parameterised, drawing from the 
biological and economic components of 
Table 1  Estimate of the harvest function for the GPPF 
  Coefficient SE t P>|t|
Dependant variable: harvest (tonnes)
Effort (days) 0.47*** 0.32 5.80 0.00
Biomass (tonnes)  0.42*** 0.08 4.87 0.00
0α  –0.09 0.08  0.79
*** indicates that the level of significance is 99 per cent. The adjusted R-squared is 0.83 and the F statistic is 62.74 
(0.00). Diagnostic tests showed no serial correlation.  
Source: Authors’ estimations.
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stocks’ result in larger profits, indicating 
a win-win for the environment and the 
fishing industry. In other words, having 
stocks of prawns larger than stocks at 
MSY, as a result of the MEY target, results 
in lower fishing costs, higher profits and a 
‘conservationist approach’ to exploitable 
prawn biomass. Once implemented, this 
will be one of the few examples in the 
world, much less in developing countries, 
of the practical use of a fisheries target that 
maximises returns and protects fish stocks 
(Grafton et al. 2007). Alternatively, an MSY 
target, the traditional target in fisheries 
management, leads to relative losses, with 
no added increase in employment. The MEY 
target can be obtained with the current fleet 
and additional fishing time and capacity. 
Indeed, the loss in profits from harvest 
at MSY compared with harvest at MEY 
is estimated to be (on average) more than 
US$187,000 per annum. The MEY target is 
clearly preferable. 
Several policy implications and 
management directives flow from this 
research, all of which the NFA is either 
implementing or pursuing actively. First, 
there need to be more secure fishing rights 
so that fishing capacity can be enhanced. The 
current harvest is less than the MEY target, 
and a reason for this is that the provision 
of annual leases to fish does not allow the 
industry to obtain finance for new vessels 
or upgrade gear or equipment, much less to 
cover standard and long-term repairs and 
maintenance. The NFA is moving to five-
year leases, with the possible introduction 
of statutory fishing rights. Not only does 
MEY show that the target harvest should 
be larger than the current harvest, it shows 
that given the current fishing technology 
for prawns, MEY can be obtained with 10 or 
less standard prawn boats. In other words, 
the current fleet, when properly fitted and 
upgraded, should be sufficient to reach 
the MEY target. The fleet needs, however, 
the means to upgrade its fishing capacity. 
Concerns about stock size are not warranted 
and fishing entitlements can be extended. 
The second main issue is access to the 
inshore fishery. As mentioned, research 
shows that about one-third of the total 
prawn catch by the commercial fleet comes 
from this zone, even though such fishing is 
prohibited. Fortunately, given this ‘natural’ 
(albeit illegal) experiment, the biological 
Table 2  MEY results and target indicators for the GPPF
Target/indicator Value 
  (tonnes) 
Mean values at steady state   
 Harvest at MEY 580 
 Biomass at MEY 800
 Harvest at MSY  635 
 Biomass at MSY  650
 Maximum carrying capacity 1,300
 Current harvest (2006) 450 
 Current biomass (2006) 980 
 Ratio of BMEY to BMSY 1.23
Source: Authors’ estimations.
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economic value increase; rather, small 
prawns are taken and returns suffer. The 
provision of a guaranteed share of catch 
would allow vessels to time catches with 
optimal prawn size. Unfortunately, tradeable 
quota systems are costly to implement and 
monitor and are undoubtedly beyond 
the reach of NFA resources at this time. 
Nevertheless, given the small number of 
operators in the fishery, an agreement on 
catch timing is possible, and is indeed under 
some discussion. 
Final remarks
The GPPF provides only the second example 
in the world of a fishery that uses an MEY 
target; the NPF in Australia is the first. An 
MEY target has two clear advantages: it 
maximises returns in the fishery and protects 
fish stocks. It is a good example of how to 
get things right in fisheries management, 
at least in terms of the right target and a 
‘healthy’ stock of fish, and its application 
is especially noteworthy in this case given 
that the GPPF is a developing-country 
resource. The GPPF has the advantage of 
not being over-exploited to begin with, so 
that rather than undergoing the painful 
process of industry restructuring to rebuild 
stock to obtain MEY, the NFA has only to 
provide conditions conducive to increasing 
fishing capacity. This can be done with the 
current fleet size and, indeed, reaching 
MEY catch levels will increase profits and 
maintain, if not increase, employment levels. 
Cooperation between the commercial fleet 
and the indigenous owners of the inshore 
fishery ensures added profitability and the 
sharing of gains from this productive area. 
Both of these actions—establishing the right 
target and ensuring sound cooperation 
between relevant stakeholders—provide 
welcome win-win outcomes for Papua 
New Guinea. 
component of the research project showed 
that the inshore fishing did not appear to 
impact adversely on the sustainability of 
the prawn resource. The economics of the 
inshore fishery is, however, critical. Catch 
rates are more than 30 per cent higher in 
this zone, adding considerably to profits, 
and without access to the inshore area 
by the commercial fleet, the target MEY 
will not be reached. To allay the tension 
between indigenous owners of the inshore 
areas and the commercial fleet, the research 
team recommended that the commercial 
fleet be allowed to access the inshore zone 
up to two nautical miles from the coast (to 
protect spawning areas) during the second 
half of the fishing year (or from July to 
November), based on an access agreement 
with the traditional resource owners. This 
recommendation has been well received 
by all stakeholders, and has provided a 
potential win-win for indigenous owners 
and the commercial industry, which is 
now negotiating precise access rights and 
amounts. The research project recommended 
a simple sharing of net profits (or at least a 
proportion of catch) in the inshore fishery, 
with percentage shares to be determined by 
use and the extent of participation in fishing 
by the industry and the traditional owners. 
This resource sharing will enable some of the 
economic benefits gained by the industrial 
fishery to be returned to the community and 
will therefore reduce the tension between 
the parties. It will also allow the commercial 
fleet to access the highly productive inshore 
area more intensively, to meet MEY.
The final management concern is the 
catch composition of prawns. MEY is the 
right target catch level, but the GPPF still 
lacks the right management instrument. 
Setting the catch level without allocated 
fishing rights—for example, individual 
tradeable quotas—does not prevent ‘race 
to fish’ behaviour. As a result, fishers do 
not delay the catch until prawn size and 
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